Tim
Geithner claims he learned of Libor manipulation when the rest of us commoners
did, in 2008. New evidence keeps coming out suggesting he should have known
much, much earlier.
The latest
example -- which puts the earliest time-stamp on Libor manipulation we've seen
yet -- is a Financial Times op-ed by former Morgan Stanley trader Douglas Keenan. He claims that Libor, a key short-term bank lending rate that affects
mortgages and other interest rates throughout the economy, was being jerked
around for fun and profit as long ago as 1991.
Let that
sink in for just a minute: Libor was being manipulated 17 years before the
financial crisis and Geithner's babe-in-the-woods discovery of it, according to
Keenan. Geithner wasn't in charge of the New York Fed at the time, but if this
was widespread knowledge years before his arrival, it makes you wonder how he
could not have heard about it for so long.
Now here's
another Keenan allegation that will blow your mind. He notes that the guy
running Morgan Stanley's rate-trading desk back then was none other than Bob
Diamond. Yes, the same Bob Diamond that ended up becoming Barclays CEO, only to
step down because his bank manipulated Libor like most people change socks.
Keenan
doesn't say he has any evidence that Diamond was some sort of
Libor-manipulatin' Ninja back in 1991. But Keenan does say that it was
widespread knowledge even then that banks lied habitually about Libor.
He found
this out when, in his early days on the trading desk, he noticed that Libor
fixings -- set by a panel of banks, who declare, on a hilarious honor system,
what their borrowing costs are -- were noticeably different from what financial
markets predicted they should be:
Futures
contracts on three-month Libor were -- and are -- traded on the London
International Financial Futures Exchange (Liffe, now part of NYSE Euronext).
There was a standard contract for the month of September. That contract had its
rate settled on the third Wednesday of the month, at 11 o'clock.
In 1991, I
had live trading screens that showed the Libor rates. In September of that
year, on the third Wednesday, at 11 o'clock, I watched those screens to see
where the futures contract should settle. Shortly afterwards, Liffe announced
the contract settlement rate. Its rate was different from what had been shown
on my screens, by a few hundredths of a per cent.
That few
hundredths of a percentage point doesn't sound like a very big deal, but it
adds up, day after day after day, on hundreds of trillions of dollars' worth of
loans and derivatives contracts. Keenan says it was costing him money on his
trades, and he complained to Liffe about it, getting nowhere.
Then he
complained about it to his new buddies on the trading desk, who all laughed and
laughed at him (emphasis mine):
I talked
with some of my more experienced colleagues about this. They told me banks
misreported the Libor rates in a way that would generally bring them profits. I
had been unaware of that, as I was relatively new to financial trading. My
naivety seemed to be humorous to my colleagues.
Imagine how
hilarious Tim Geithner's naivete must seem to them! He had, after all, been in
charge of the New York Federal Reserve since 2003. That organization runs point
in the financial markets for the Fed and thus has intimate knowledge of and
involvement in interest rates, including Libor. New York Fed officials talk all
the time to people in the market. Somewhere along the way you might think they'd
have heard about Libor manipulation.
In fact,
they definitely heard about it at least once, in 1998, from Fed analyst Jeremy
Berkowitz, who wrote a paper raising alarms about the accuracy of Libor and the
ease with which it could be manipulated. Anecdotes in his paper dated back to
1996.
As Business
Insider's Simone Foxman wrote, the report "suggests that the Fed was
already ... concerned about the effects of inaccurate reporting by banks about
their lending practices ten years before the financial crisis. Further,
acknowledgments that a very small contingent of banks potentially could
manipulate rates suggests that the Fed may very well have seen this
coming."
And yet
somehow Geithner only found out about Libor manipulation in 2008, a decade
later.
This is an
extraordinary missed opportunity, if it's true. Although it's hard to imagine
what Geithner would have done about Libor manipulation had he learned earlier,
considering his "actions" after his late discovery of it. He
apparently didn't tell British regulators that the New York Fed had direct
evidence that Barclays had admitted to not submitting an "honest" Libor. He didn't raise alarm bells in the market about the possibility that
Libor was not accurate. He didn't tell U.S. banks to cool it with the Libor
fraud.
What's
more, he allowed Libor to be used in loans to banks under the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility and to American International Group, rubber-stamping
Libor's legitimacy and potentially costing taxpayers millions, if not billions,
of dollars.
Geithner's
response raises questions about just how cozy he and other regulators have been
with the banks they're supposed to be regulating -- and makes it even harder to
believe his claim of utter cluelessness about Libor manipulation before 2008.
Related Articles:
Elizabeth Warren On Libor: 'Go Get 'Em' - New
Geithner on Libor: U.S. was first to raise red flags
Elizabeth Warren On Libor: 'Go Get 'Em'
Geithner on Libor: U.S. was first to raise red flags

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